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DEATH AS AFFECTING OFFERS AND AGENCIES
Behind the law of offer and acceptance runs the theory, though
in truth it is but a fiction, that contractual agreement is predicated
upon a literal meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.
"It must, to constitute a contract, appear that the two
minds were at one, at the same moment of time, that is,
that there was an offer continuing up to the moment of
acceptance. If there was not such a continuing offer, then
the acceptance comes to nothing.1
"The defendants (the seller-offerors) must be con-
sidered in law as making, during every instant of the
time their letter was travelling, the same identical offer to
the plaintiffs" 2
"It is elementary that there must be a meeting of two
ninds in one and the same intention in order that there
may be a contract" I
Sine a dead nind cannot agree, it has with logic inevitably
followed that an offer is eo snstant'& revoked upon the death of
the offeror. 4
"The continuation of an offer is in the nature of its
constant repetition, which necessarily requires someone
capable of making a repetition. Obviously this can no
more be done by a dead man than a contract can, in the
first instance, be made by a dead man" 5
The Lord President of the Court of Session of Scotland has
more fully explained the theory, saying, arguendo
"Death or insanity may prevent the completion of the
contract as effectually as the most complete revocation,
but they are not properly revocations of the offer. They
are not acts of the will of the offerer, and their
effect does not rest upon a supposed change of purpose.
They interrupt the completion of the contract,-that is,
the making of the contract,-because a contract cannot be
made directly with a dead man or a lunatic. The contract
is not made until the offer is accepted, and if the person
with whom you merely intend to contract dies or becomes
insane before you have contracted with him, you can no
longer contract directly with him. You cannot, be
abhibiting your acceptance to an offer, and addressing
it to a dead man or a lunatic, make it binding on him,
IDcktnson v. Dodds, L. R. 2 Oh. Div. 463, 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 607(1876).
2 Adams v. DIntsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681 (1818).
3Ross v. Savage, 66 Fla. 106, 63 So. 148 (1913).
'13 C. J. 298 and cases there cited.
'Pratt v. Trustees of Baptist Soczety, 93 Ill. 475 (1879)
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
whether his death or insanity be or be not known to you.
In such a case there is an interruption-an effectual obsta-
cle to the completion of the contract, equivalent in result
to a revocation, though operating by very different facts
and very different principles" 6
Contrary to the usual rule that revocation must be communi-
cated to the offeree before it becomes effective,- a revocation by
death operates regardless of the offeree's knowledge of the death.'
Even though the offeree not knowing of the death, but after it
chronologically, accepts the offer and in reliance thereon changes
his position, there is no contract and the offeree must suffer the
consequences. In Browne v. McDonald9 an uncle promised to
pay a reasonable compensation for the board, tuition, and clothing
to be furnished his niece. His promise was in the nature of a
continuing offer. It was held to be terminated by the death of the
promisor, the plaintiff being unable to recover for services ren-
dered the niece after the death, even though the plaintiff did
not know of the death and the offeror's executor failed to notify
her. In Michigan State Bank v. Leavenworth"0 it was decided
that the efficacy of a letter of credit is confined to the life of the
writer. Hence no recovery can be had upon it for goods sold or
advances made after his death.
In Jordan v. Dobbsnsl" the Court said
"The guaranty is carefully drawn, but it is in its na-
ture nothing more than a simple guaranty for a proposed
sale of goods. The provision, that it shall continue until
written notice is given by the guarantor that it shall not
apply to future purchases, affects the mode in which the
guarantor might exercise his right to revoke it, but it can-
not prevent its revocation by his death No liability ex-
isted under it against the guarantor at the time of his
death, but the goods for which the plaintiffs seek to re-
cover were all sold afterwards.
"We are not impressed by the plaintiff's argument
that it is inequitable to throw the loss upon them. It is
no hardship to require traders, whose business it is to deal
in goods, to exercise diligence so far as to ascertain
Thomson et al. v. James, 18 Sc. Sess. Cas. (Dunlop) 1 (The Court of
Session) (1855).
'Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411, 37 L. ed. 790 (1893). Recognized
in Malloy v. Drumheller 68 Wash. 106, 122 Pac. 1005 (1912).
'Aitken et al. v. Lang's Admrs., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. W 154 (1899) The
Palo Alto. 18 Fed. Cas. 1062, No. 10,700 (1847).
0129 Mass. 66 (1880)
102 Williams, 209 (Vt. 1856).
11122 Mass. 168 (1877). See WILLISTON-, CONTRACTS (1921) Sec. 62,
footnote 1.
DEATH, OFFERS AND AGENCIES
whether a person upon whose credit they are selling is
living."'
2
California has apparently put upon its statute books the rule
that death instantly revokes an offer. 18 So has Louisiana.,
The inequitable results of this rule reach into many of the most
frequent types of business transactions. A merchant who sells.to
a distant sole trader inevitably assumes a life insurance risk.
Typically A, an Alaskan retailer, ordered goods of B, a Seattle
wholesaler, the order from A having been posted on May 1, reach-
ing B on May 25. B shipped the goods north by the first boat.
A had died on the twenty-third of May, but B did not learn thereof
until the Steamship Company reported a refusal to take the goods.
Losses because of deterioration and obsolescence and freight costs
fall on B. A broker or importer who resells goods on the faith of
an accepted offer to sell from a third person, meanwhile deceased,
or one who buys on the faith of an accepted offer to buy made by
a third person, meanwhile deceased, is similarly situated.
Closely kindred to the principle that minds must meet to con-
tract is the common law doctrine of renewal or continuity of au-
thorization in principal-agent and partnership relationships. The
cases hold that at each moment of time a new impulse of authori-
zation goes out from the principal to his agent and renews the
power of the latter to act on behalf of the principal or partner.
So with Anglo-Saxon fidelity it follows that since a dead prin-
cipal cannot send out invigorating impulses, an agent's authority
is terminated the moment death occurs,' 5 even though the authority
expressly provides that it is irrevocable and shall survive the
death of the principal,1 and even though innocent third parties
have been misled into supposed contractual obligations with the
late principal and have acted (as by delivering goods) in reliance
thereonY Thus a payment made to an agent after the death of
"But how can a trader be sure that his guarantor is living other than
by insisting that no sale be made without his physical presence at the
place of business? Such would render offers of guaranty utterly imprac-
ticable. Jaffee v. Jacobson, 48 Fed. 21 (1891), reports an interesting in-
stance of the defeat of a clearly proved intention.
13Civil Code of California, Sec. 1587, as interpreted in Shaw i'. King
63 Cal. App. 18, 218 Pac. 50 (1923), where it was (apparently) held there
was no contract where a brother after forwarding his sister money on
which to come to him, and offering to maintain her during the rest of her
life, died before the offer was accepted.
11 Civil Code of Louisiana, 1810.
15Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520, 37 L. ed. 1167 (1893) Gilnwre v. Con-
tinental Casualty Co., 58 Wash. 203, 108 Pac. 447 (1910).
'. Weaver v. Richards, 114 Mich. 395, 108 N. W 382 (1906) Ex parte
Welch 2 N. B. Eq. 129 (1900)
"Blades v. Free, 7 L. J. K. B. 0. S. 211 (1829)
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the principal will not discharge the debt, although made in actual
ignorance of the principal's death."8 In Riggs v. Cage,19 an agent
purchased goods for his principal after the latter's death but be-
fore either the agent or the seller had notice thereof. The estate
was not liable.
Occasional, perhaps frequent, hardship to individuals is of
course of less importance to the State than is the maintaining of
consistent and definite legal principles upon which its courts may
base their decisions. But upon inquiry it seems that the courts
do not consistently demand that a meeting of the minds precede
contractual obligation, it appears that the doctrine of constant
renewal of an agent's authority is unnecessary, has been judi-
ciously termed harsh and regretfully followed, and has been sub-
jected to statutory modification, it is seen that under some circum-
stances, though a contract be wanting, the estate of a decedent is
required to indemnify third persons who have changed their posi-
tions in reliance upon the decedent.
A LITERAL MEETING OF THE MINDS IS UNNECESSARY
A meeting of the minds-an agreement at a given instant of time
-is unnecessary to a contract. In illustration Jones, in Seattle,
handed to Brown an offer to sell securities at a specified price, the
offer to be open two weeks. It was understood that Brown was leav-
ing for a trip south and would mail his acceptance or refusal. A
few hours after Brown's departure Jones received from X an
offer substantially higher than he had himself quoted to Brown.
Jones at once devoted his energies to the task of finding Brown
in order to revoke his offer and clear the way for an acceptance
of the offer of X. But Brown could not be found. Telegrams,
letters, and even personal messengers failed to reach him. On
the twelfth day Brown mailed a properly stamped and addressed
acceptance. That there was a contract between Jones and Brown
cannot be questioned. Yet the minds of Jones and Brown were
never in accord. When the offer was made, Jones was willing but
Brown was doubtful. When Brown accepted, Jones had for ten
days been strongly against the contract. As said in Thomson v
James20
"In a great many cases the maxim that there must be
a concurrence of will at the moment of completion of the
contract cannot be rigidly or literally applied. The very
opposite may be the fact. Although one cannot, by ac-
'sLong v. Thayer supra, Michigan Inc. Co. v. Leavenuorth, 30 Vt. 11
(1856) See also Blades v. Free, supra.
1 2 Humphr. 350, 37 Am. Dec. 559 (Tenn. 1829)
' See note 6.
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cepting an offer, bind a dead or insane person, he may
bind an unwilling person, one who has altogether changed
his mind. Such cases are not unfrequent. If an offer
bears that it is to be binding for a certain number of days
or hours, the offeror may repent before the lapse of the
given time, and yet at the end of it may find imself un-
willingly bound, or if an offeror changes his mind, but
does not take the proper steps to have his change of mind
conveyed to the offeree,-either writes no letter, or writes
a letter which he omits to send or sends it by mistake to a
wrong place,---he may find hunself unwillingly bound.
Other cases may be figured. Mere change of mind on the
part of the offeree will not prevent an effectual accept-
ance,-not even although that change of mind should be
evidenced by having been commumcated to a third party,
or recorded in a formal writing, as for instance in a no-
tonal instrument. In all these cases a binding contract
may be made between the parties without that consensus
or concursus which a rigidly literal reading of the maxim
or rule would require."
Likewise although a person's intent is not to contract, he will
be contractually bound if by his words or actions he indicates the
contrary to another who in good faith accepts his apparent offer,
the criterion of intent being the reasonable impression of the offeree
rather than the hidden though actual intent of the offeror.
Not strictly germane, but perhaps worthy of mention are the
cases which hold that an acceptance mailed before but not received
until after the death of the proposer results in a binding contract. 21
In a significant line of cases concerned with the death of a
guarantor under a continuing guaranty, the guarantee was said
to be entitled to recover from the guarantor's estate when, without
knowledge of the death, he extends credit in reliance on the guar-
antor's promise to pay if the debtor should not.22 The guarantor's
promise is of course but an offer unless there be a consideration
supporting it.22  There has been an acceptance after the death of
the offeror.
2- Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N. Y., 1830)
22Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147, 34 Atl. 1025 (1895). Knotts v. Butler, 31
S. C. Eq. 143 (1858) Bradbury v. Morgan, 31 Law J., Exch. 462, 158 Reprint
877 (1862). The guaranty read: "Messrs. Bradbury & Co.,-I request you
will give credit in the usual way of your business to H. L., and, in consider-
ation of your doing so, I do hereby engage to guarantee the regular pay-
ment of his account with you, until I give you notice to the contrary, to the
extent of £100." This case was cited at the argument of Offord v. Davies, 12
C. B. (N. S.) 748, which is contrary. Professor Williston thinks the Brad-
bury case not an authority on the point in connection with which here
cited. Fennell v. McGuire (Ont. 1870), 21 U. C. C. P. 134, cites both the
Bradbury and the Offord cases, and holds with the former. Other cases
have refused to follow it.
See Offord v. Davies, supra.
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In Egbert v. National Crown Bank24 the guarantor promised that
the guaranty should remain in force until revoked by notice. In
principle, the status is that of a naked promise to keep an offer
open for a specified time or until revoked. More particularly, the
guaranty (offer) in the Egbert case provided that it should be a
continuing guarantee "until the undersigned, or the executor or
administrator of the undersigned, shall have given the bank notice
in writing to make no further advances on the security of this
guarantee." It was held that actual notice of the subsequent
death of one of the signers did not terminate the liability of the
estate of the deceased under the continuing offer of guaranty, but
that the guaranty remains in force against all the guarantors until
each and all of them or their respective executors and administra-
tors give notice to terminate it.
Recognizing the inequities resulting from an instant and un-
announced revocation should the offeror die, systems of law other
than our own have provided to the contrary
The German code provides
"One, who proposes to another the conclusion of a con-
tract, is bound by the proposition unless he has provided
that he shall not be bound."
"The conclusion of the contract is not prevented by the
death or incompetence of the proponent before acceptance,
unless a different intention of the proponent is to be pre-
sumed. "2"
As translated in Pollock, the Burgerliches Gesetzbach reads,
"A contract is not prevented from coming into existence by the
death or incapacity of the offeror before acceptance, unless the
offeror has expressed a contrary intention.-
2 6
Japan, following in general the German law, holds
"An expression of intention made to a person at a dis-
tance takes effect when the notification thereof reaches the
other party
"Even though the person expressing intention dies or
loses capacity subsequent to the dispatch of the notifica-
tion the validity of the expression of intention is not
affected thereby "
"(However) The provisions of Article 97, Paragraph 2,
do not apply in case the offerer has expressed a contrary
intention or the other party had knowledge of the fact of
his death or loss of capacity 27
And the Indian Contract Act which, it would seem, should not
"L. R. 1918 A. C. 903.
2' German Civil Code, secs. 145 and 153, Loewy's Translation.
NVALD'S POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS, 3rd Ed. p. 42 note.
"1 Civil Code of Japan, Arts. 97 and 525, ae Becker's Translation.
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be markedly at variance with the English Common Law, makes the
knowledge of the other party before acceptance a condition of the
proposal being revoked by the death of the offeror.28
As will be shortly seen, the Civilians, and following them the
French, somewhat inconsistently provide for the continuation of
an agent's authority after the death of Ins principal but neglect to
protect the very similar situation of an offeree whose offeror has
died.2
0
Thus it is apparent that a literal meeting of the minds, an
eo mnstanti concurrence, is not a contractual necessity
NoR is THE DOCTRniE OF CONSTANT RENEWAL OF AN AGENT'S
AUTHORITY NECESSARY, ITS RESULTS ARE INEQUITABLE
It is not necessary to predicate the law of agency upon a theory
of constant repeated authorizations. 0  The civilians do not31  If
an analogy not available to the founders of the doctrine be per-
mitted, the common law and civil law theories may be electrically
illustrated. Under the common law the agent receives the author-
ity-ns power-to represent the principal as thru a wire. A
current of authority is instantly flowing from the principal to
the agent. It stops when the wire is cut by death. Even the
ostensible authority of the agent, that authority wnch is Ins by vir-
tue of appearances and is perhaps beyond Ins actual authority,
ends although from the eyes of a tnrd person appearances are
as before. In contrast, the authority given under the civil law is
carried as in storage batteries, the life of which is determined by
their contents. Since the agent carries Ins power with him it is
not without Ins knowledge terminated by the death of the
principal.
3 2
Nevertheless, in spite of its apparent logical severity, the com-
mon law, in response to the demands of commerce, has strayed far
from a strict adherence to the doctrine of an inevitable revocation
should the principal die.
The economic demand underlying such departure is strongly
put in Ish v. Crane33 The court insists that the great and practi-
cal purposes and interests of trade and commerce, and the in-
perions necessity of confidence in the social and commercial rela-
tions of men, require that an agency, once constituted, continue.
3' Anglo-Indian Codes, Stokes (1887), p. 550.
° TAV Ry, Contracts par correspondence, see 204.
10 For reasons obvious, there will be no discussion of agencies coupled
with an interest.3 'Inst. , 27, 10; Digest 17, 1, 26, Story Ag., sees. 491, 495.3 In part borrowed from 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855.
3 8 Ohio St. 520, 540 (1858).
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In order that there may be this confidence in the authority of the
agent, mere revocation will not be sufficient as to persons who
have been dealing with the agent as such. There must be actual
or implied notice of the revocation. And the court could conceive
of no reason why the law should be different in cases of re-ocation
by mere operation of law It seemed,
9 that in all such cases the party who has by his own
conduct purposely invited confidence and credit to be re-
posed in another as his agent, and has thereby induced
another to deal with him in good faith, as such agent,
neither such party nor his representatives ought to be per
mitted, in law, to gainsay the commission of credit and
confidence so given to him by the principal. The exten-
sive relations of commerce are often remote as well as
intimate. The application of this doctrine must include
factors, foreign as well as domestic, commission merchants,
consignees, and supercargoes, and other agents remote
from their principal, and who are required for long periods
of time, not infrequently, by their principal, to transact
business of immense importance, without a possibility of
knowing perhaps even the probable continuance of the life
of the principal. It must not nnfrequently happen that
valuable cargoes are sold and purchased in foreign coun-
tries by the agent, in obedience to his instructions from
his principal, after and without knowledge of his death.
And so, too, cases are constantly occurring of money being
collected and paid by agent, under instructions of the prin-
cipal, after and without knowledge of his death. In all
these cases there is certainly every reason for holding valid
and binding the acts so done by the agency which the prin-
cipal had, in his life, constituted and ordered.
Since the opinion in Ish v. Crane was written, communication has
been much accelerated, we are inclined to think that the commum-
cation of messages is but a matter of moments. This is in part
true. But it is a factor favoring the communication of the fact of
death, rather than a point supporting the practicability of an
inquiry as to the principal's existence at the moment of signing a
contract. Death comes but once, it is natural and reasonable that
all interested parties be notified. Many contracts are signed, pay-
ments on account are hourly made, it is farcical to assume the
feasibility of repeated inquiries as to the health of the man with
whom one at a distance deals.34
"In Deweese v. Muff, 57 Neb. 17, 77 N. W 361 (1898) it was said, "Un-
doubtedly the rule is that the death of a principal instantly terminates the
agency- but it by no means follows that all dealings with the agent there-
after are absolutely void. Where in good faith one deals with an agent
within his apparent authority in ignorance of the death of the principal,
the heirs and representatives of the latter may be bound, in case the act to
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Despite New York's adherence to the common law doctrine that
death revokes an agent's power even as to third parties dealing
with the agent m good faith and without notice 5 and the general
rule that a check of itself is a mere order for the payment of money,
not operating as an assignment of any part of the fund, 6 it was
held in Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Company,3 7
that the rule does not apply to the payment of a check by a bank
without knowledge of the drawer's death.
Carriger v. Whittington 8 and Cassiday v. McKenzie 0 have re-
fused to follow the common law rule. These cases have, of course,
been criticized in decisions following the established doctrine. 40
In Davidson v. Provost4 a partner's authority to superintend
the construction of a building was held to continue after the death
of his partner.
In response to commercial needs, at least six states have through
statutory enactment provided that within specified limits a bank
may pay a check after the death of the drawer.42
In France the law is.
"If the agent does not know of his principal's death, or
of any other cause terminating the agency, then what he
does in ignorance that his authority has terminated is
valid.
"In the above mentioned cases any contract entered into
be done is not required to be performed in the name of the principal." It
is suggested that the mentioned distinction upon the basis of whether or
not the act need be done in the name of the principal is unsound. The
name in which the contract is made is not the gist. The philosophy really
behind the case is one of response to commercial need.
"Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilson, 339 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 784.
(1893)
"Atty. Gen. -v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 325 (1877). O'Connor
v. Mechanics Bank, 124 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 816 (1391) see WASH. CoMp.
STAT. (Remington, 1922) §3579.
"209 N. Y. 12, 102 N. E. 537 (1913) See also Deweese v. Muff, supra.
Carrzger's Admsnstrator v. Whittington's Administrator 26 Mo. 311,
72 Am. Dec. 212 (1858).
"4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76 (1842). See also: Murdoek v.
Leath, 10 Heisk. 166 (Tenn. 1870) Lenz v. Brown, 41 Wis. 172 (1876)
Garrett v. Trabue et al., 82 Ala. 227, 3 So. 349 (1887) Dams v. Dams, 92
Ala. 173, 9 So. 736 (1891)
40Clayton v. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353, 357 (1876) Travers v. Grane, 15
Cal. 12, 17 (1860).
"135 Ill. App. 126 (1889).
"2 New Jersey, Chap. 125 Laws 1916 (10 days after date of check)
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1918, Chap. 204, sec. 4001-2; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1916,
Chap. 52, sec. 23; Massachusetts, Chap. 73, sec. 17, Revised Laws; West Vir-
ginia, Anno. Code, 1913, Chap. 54, sec. 3105, Vermont, Gen. Laws 1917,
Chap. 139, sec. 2854.
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or anything done by the agent with third parties who acted
in good faith is binding." 43
AN ESTATE IMAY BE BOUND OUTSIDE OF CONTRACT
The rights and obligations of the estate of a decedent are not
limited to those incurred by contract. The acts or words of the
decedent may later estop his personal representative from assert-
ing a claim which would otherwise accrue to the benefit of the estate
or from denying a claim which is asserted against the estate."
Certain tortious injuries are subject to redress even though the
tort feasor has meanwhile died.
Likewise claims arising in quasi-contract are enforceable against
the estate. A quasi-contract lacks the element of agreement, it is
not a contract, though frequently referred to as such.4" It is
founded upon the principal that one person should not be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another.4 6 It is difficult to conceive or a
basic distinction between a profit and a sawng so far as the net
result is concerned. 47 An estate which is saved the loss of $1,000 is
benefited to the extent of $1,000 just as is an estate which has
been rendered services or received goods to the value of $1,000.
While it is not suggested that a recovery under quasi-contract
should be allowed in instances of offers innocently accepted after
the death of the offeror, it is submitted that same legal concept of
equity and fairness which prompted a fictional system of recovery
under quasi-contract should discover a means of recovery against
an estate which seeks to be enriched through saving (the avoidance
13 Sees. 2008, 2009, French Civil Code, Wright's Translation. But the
onus of showing that he acted in good faith lies on the third party
(LAURENT, Vol. XXVIII, par. 113)
" See cases compiled 21 C. J. 1182.
45 "To say that the law supplies the privity and the promise is but to
indulge in legal fiction. There is no place for fiction in modern law. At
a time when it was thought that no new right could be recognized unless
it could be enforced through some old form of procedure, a fiction which
undertook to clothe a newly-recognized right with the semblance of the
garb of an old one, may have served a purpose, but fictions of the law
never did deceive, nor can they now serve any real useful purpose. They
should not be allowed to help or to hurt any man's cause, but should be
discarded as the archaic contrivances which they are. If a man has
suffered a wrong which on recognized principles of right and justice the
law ought to redress a remedy should be given him, otherwise not." Hey-
wood v. Northern Assur Co., 133 Minn. 360, 158 N. IV 632 (1916) See also
Starke v. Cheeseman, 1 Ld. Raym. 538; Sierns v. Bank, 7 S. D. 338, 64 N. W
167 (1895) Harty Bros. v. Polakok, 237 Ill. 559, 86 N. E. 1085 (1908).
"KEENER ON QUASI-CONTRACTS, p. 19 et seq., WOODWARD, QUASI-CON-
TRACTS, sees. 3, 4.
4 Professor Woodward points out that enrichment in the sense of
profit is not the proper test. It is sufficient to show that defendant re-
ceived something desired by him. This would strengthen the argument
here; decedent desired the offeree to do that which he did do. See: WOOD-
VARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS, secs. 8, 107, 118, 119, and 125.
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of a contract winch the executor deems undesirable) though at the
expense of a person who had been led into ins costly position by the
acts or words of the decedent. In fact, enforcement of offers inno-
cently accepted after the offerer's death does not constitute a
judicial interference -with decedent's estate to the extent that a
quasi-contractual decision against an estate is the imposition of
another's (the court's) judgment in the conduct of the decedent's
affairs. A man lies unconscious in the street, a bystander calls
a physician, because of or in spite of his care, the man dies with-
out recovering consciousness, the estate must pay a sum winch the
court decides represents the amount the decedent during his life
was enriched at the expense of the time and skill of the physician.
The decedent had no say in the matter whatsoever; he may not
have believed in calling physicians. In contrast, in a contract case
the decedent hinself sets in motion the forces winch result in the
unjust position in winch the offeree is unwittingly placed. The
decedent deliberately made an offer, he intended to enjoy the
benefits of the contract should Ins offer be accepted, he planned to
bear the cost of his part of the contractual obligations. His estate
should bear the loss, if any, rather than tinrd parties who relied
upon decedent's expressed intention.
CoNcLU DNG
To be consistent, a legal system winch decides that engagements
are binding when entered into between an agent and a third per-
son, neither knowing of the principal's death, should likewise hold
that an accepted offer completes a contract when the offeree accepts
not knowing of the offeror's death.
Equally consistent would be a system wherein a contract entered
into between an agent and a tinrd party, neither knowing of the
principal's death, is binding except that at the election of the
representatives of the decedent, it may be abrogated upon indemni-
fying the third party and wherein a good faith acceptance of
an offer, the offeree not knowing of the offeror's subsequent death,
results in a binding contract except that at the election of the rep-
resentatives of the decedent it may be abrogated upon indemnify-
mg the offeree.
It is submitted that the latter set constitute the proper rules.
"Where the third party knows of the death and the agent does not,
there should be no contract, there being no reasonable impression on the
third party that under the circumstances a contract would be intended.
But where the agent knows of the death and deceives, should there not
still be a contract, the decedent, rather than the third party, being respon-
sible for the choice of an untrustworthy agent?
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They give to the estate the advantage of withdrawing from the
contract if such withdrawal be made without injury to others. They
protect routine business transactions which, despite eminent sug-
gestion to the contrary,49 cannot be practically said to be negotiated
with an implied provision that an offer is good unless the offeror
meanwhile dies and that the agent is authorized unless the principal
has meanwhile passed away Such an impression is not that of the
business, or professional, or other person entering into contractual
relationships.
The need of fiction is long since passed.50 But if fiction be
needed, it may be found in an extension of estoppel to comprehend
such situations."' The franker method would be to openly bring
the law into conformity with economic need and usage and for
purpose of legal reasoning, when needed, to imply with each offer
and agency a proviso that should the offerer or principal die the
contract may be rescinded upon indemnifying the offeree or third
party for this actual loss, if any
PAUL P ASHLEY.-
'9 Professor Parks suggests that implied in every offer is the provision
that it will terminate upon the death of the offeror, i. e., an offer upon a
contingency. (19 MICH. L. REV. 150, 159).
O Note 44 supra. "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."
Judge Cardozo in Berkey v. Third Ave. By. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58
(1926.
r1 The principles underlying Seavy v. Drake, 62 N. H. 393 (1882)
would not have to be far extended to enfold the instant problem. Discus-
sions of this subject, or aspects of it, are found: 24 COLUMBIA L. REV. 294,
27 HARVARD L. REV. 644, 14 ILLINOIS L. REV. 85, 18 MICHIGAN L. REV. 201,
19 MICHIGAN L. REV. 152; 23 MICHIGAN L. REV. 475, 10 MINNESOTA L. REV.
373.
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